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and of the nature of the Paris C o m m u n e of 1792 
ought therefore to have been appointed. A n d 
or ig inal publ icat ion dates of reprints ought to 
have been cited. T h e book is not based on quite 
so much new feminist scholarship as the bibl io-
graphy i n its present form suggests. 
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In Public Man, Private Woman Jean Bethke 
Elshtain sets out to use the concepts of publ ic 
and private "as a conceptual prism through 
w h i c h to see the story of women and politics 
from Plato to the present" (p. xiv), and to l ink 
the public/private distinction to various "under-
standings of h u m a n nature, theories of language 
and action and the divergent values and ends of 
famil ia l and pol i t ica l l i fe . " (p. 3). Her subject is 
especially appeal ing to feminist thinkers, since, 
as she points out, the public/private distinction 
and the values attached to each realm are closely 
related to many people's beliefs about and atti-
tudes toward women. Unfortunately, her treat-
ment of the subject is disappointing. 
Elshtain begins wi th a critical review of great 
figures in the history of pol i t ical phi losophy. 
She is clearly partial to Augustine, Aquinas and 
Luther and tells us that: "Christ ianity ushered a 
moral revolution into the world which dramati-
cally, and for the better, transformed the prevail-
i n g images of male and female, publ ic and p r i -
vate" (p. 56), and that: "Augustine, taken al l i n 
a l l , is one of the great undoers of Greek mis-
ogyny. . . . " (p.73). Anyone m a k i n g these claims 
surely must show some concern about Augus-
tine's obsessive fear of women's capacity to 
inspire lust, Augustine's and Aquinas ' denigra-
t ion of sexual pleasure, and A q u i n a s ' agreement 
w i t h Aristotle that w o m a n is a man manque, 
created for and justified by her role i n reproduc-
t ion . Yet Elshtain fails even to acknowledge that 
these are difficulties for her views, and she 
apparently feels no obl igat ion to deal wi th fem-
inist scholars' criticisms of Christ ian theology. 
W h i l e Elshtain is unduly gentle wi th Chris -
tian thinkers, other "greats" do not escape her 
unfavourable, and often unfair, crit icism. She is 
hard on J.S. M i l l ' s The Subjection of Women, 
for example, but her reading of it is shallow and 
inaccurate. She misunderstands or misrepresents 
M i l l ' s theory of the or ig in of women's subjection 
and his analysis of how men and women come to 
desire undue private and publ ic power, both of 
w h i c h are clear i n M i l l ' s text. In addit ion, she 
attributes si l ly views to M i l l without justifica-
t ion, c la iming , for instance, that M i l l always 
regards a h u m a n relation's or institution's being 
traditional as a reason to oppose it. M i l l actually 
says: " T h e generality of a practice is i n some 
cases a strong presumption that it is, or at a l l 
events once was, conducive to laudable ends." 1 
Elshta in accuses M i l l of f a i l i n g to recognize the 
importance of men's economic power over their 
wives, yet M i l l explici t ly discusses this, conclud-
i n g that women must have the power of earning 
their o w n l i v i n g i n order to have equality i n 
marriage. There is m u c h to criticize i n M i l l ' s 
feminist theory, and Elshtain draws our atten-
t ion to some serious difficulties, but her cr i t i -
cisms are often misplaced because she does not 
deal carefully w i t h the texts she discusses. 
Elshtain's treatment of modern feminist texts 
i n the second section of the book is no more 
satisfying than her discussion of the classics of 
pol i t ica l phi losophy. She is ungenerous i n her 
interpretation and crit icism of feminist thinkers, 
apparently u n w i l l i n g to see anything valuable 
i n theories w h i c h contain mistakes and implaus-
ibilities. A n d although elsewhere Elshtain shows 
concern for the historical context of theories, 
when discussing the work o f modern feminists, 
especially radical and liberal feminists, she makes 
no allowance for its pol i t ica l context. Further-
more, some of her generalizations about schools 
of feminist theory are outrageous. She says, for 
instance, that the a i m of radical feminists is to 
return to matriarchy. Yet she recognizes Marge 
Piercy's book, Woman on the Edge of Time, to 
be presenting a radical feminist picture of U t o -
pia , and that book describes a sexually egalitar-
ian anarchist community. She claims that a l l 
l iberal feminists are positivists and environmen-
tal determinists, and that they rarely speak of 
cit izenship. She even states later i n the book that 
feminism has tended to be hostile toward or 
suspicious of discussions about heterosexuality 
and the needs of chi ldren. One begins to wonder 
if Elshtain has ever seen a MS. magazine. 
T h e author's o w n thoughts on the publ i c and 
private realms are presented i n the third section 
of the book. They divide roughly into a discus-
sion of research methods and a presentation of 
her conclusions thus far. She praises Dorothy 
Smith's method of taking subjects' self-descrip-
tions seriously but then expresses a serious reser-
vation about this and other methods of inquiry 
and theory-building. T h i s reservation is, I think, 
based u p o n a couple of fundamental mistakes. 
Elshtain equates the particularity of individuals ' 
lives w i t h the realm of the private, and she seems 
to think that any appl icat ion of abstract con-
cepts to individuals , i.e. any general description 
of people, especially i n terms of the publ ic 
wor ld , robs them of their particularity and of 
their private lives. Of course, abstract description 
does not destroy or even deny the particularity of 
individuals , and theorizing about people i n pub-
l ic terms does not cast them out of their private 
lives, yet at a number of points i n the book 
(especially p. 305), E lshtain seems not to under-
stand these things. 
One of the major theses of the book's f inal 
section is that some form of family is universally 
necessary to meet the needs of children. A l t h o u g h 
it is not clear what sort of family the author has 
i n mind , she talks of children's need for intensive, 
eroticized relations wi th parents or their per-
manent surrogates. T h i s is an important idea 
w h i c h has been discussed extensively by others. 
Elshtain's evidence for her thesis, however, seems 
to consist of the w i l d boy of Aveyron, the failure 
of many 1960's communes to raise their children 
wel l , and the cases of neglected children who 
turned out like Charles Manson. In the end she 
encourages feminists to defend family life against 
those pressures from the publ ic wor ld w h i c h 
erode it. But I was left wondering what sort of 
family life we are to defend, especially since 
Elshtain repeatedly implies that there can be no 
appl icat ion of the ideals of freedom, justice and 
equality i n the private sphere. 
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T h e Task Force began its work i n Oct., 1979, 
originally intending to complete its report wi th in 
a year. Its composition was as follows: 
1. Four representatives from private broad-
casting. 
2. Six persons representing the publ ic inter-
est ( including two women each from the fields of 
social science research and the media). 
3. Four representatives from the advertising 
industry. 
